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Abstract
Financial markets are central to the transmission of uncertainty shocks. This paper
documents a new aspect of the interaction between the two by showing that uncertainty
shocks have radically di¤erent macroeconomic implications depending on the state nan-
cial markets are in when they occur. Using monthly US data, we estimate a nonlinear
VAR where economic uncertainty is proxied by the (unobserved) volatility of the struc-
tural shocks, and a regime change occurs whenever credit conditions cross a critical
threshold. An exogenous increase in uncertainty has recessionary e¤ects in both good
and bad credit regimes, but its impact on output is estimated to be ve times larger
when the economy is experiencing nancial distress. Accounting for this nonlinearity,
uncertainty accounts for about 1% of the peak fall in industrial production observed in
the 20072009 recession.
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JEL Classi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1 Introduction
Credit market disruptions and economic uncertainty are commonly listed among the main
causes of the prolonged recession experienced by the US and other western economies after the
outbreak of the nancial crisis in 2008 (Stock andWatson, 2012). Financial markets are known
to be capable of generating shocks that are as powerful as those analyzed by the traditional
real business cycle literature.1 Uncertainty or riskshocks have also recently come to the fore
in both policy and research debates as an important independent source of economic cycles.2
There is a clear link between the two: since investors price risk, nancial markets naturally
seize up when economic uncertainty is high. Indeed, while the role of uncertainty has been
traditionally explained by appealing to the existence of real frictions (Bernanke 1993; Bloom
2009, 2014), a recent line of research places nancial frictions at the centre of the transmission
mechanism (Arellano et al., 2012; Christiano et al., 2014; Caldara et al., 2014; Gilchrist et al.,
2014), showing that nancial markets are the crucial link in the propagation of uncertainty
shocks both in the US and elsewhere.
This paper examines a conjecture that follows naturally from the nancial viewof the
transmission mechanism. If uncertainty a¤ects the real economy mainly through nancial
markets, its impact should depend on the intensity of the nancial frictions in the economy, and
thus it could vary signicantly over the cycle under the inuence of uctuations in asset prices
and lendersand borrowersbalance sheet conditions. When private sector balance sheets are
sound, the economy might behave as if it were nancially unconstrained, shutting down the
nancial channel. Weak balance sheets and thinnancial markets, on the contrary, could
boost the transmission mechanism and make the economy highly vulnerable to a marginal
increase in uncertainty. To investigate this possibility, we estimate a nonlinear VAR using
monthly US data covering the period between January 1973 and May 2014 and study how the
response of output and prices to uncertainty shocks depends on aggregate nancial conditions.
The model has two distinguishing features. First, aggregate uncertainty is captured directly
by the average volatility of the economys structural shocks, which is allowed to a¤ect the
models endogenous variables (Mumtaz and Theodoridis, 2012; Mumtaz and Surico, 2013;
1The real implications of nancial disturbances are studied by Gilchrist and Zakraiek (2009, 2012), Nolan
and Thoenissen (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Helbling et al. (2011), Perri
and Quadrini (2011), Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Meeks (2012), Liu et al. (2013) among others.
2The research on uncertainty is reviewed below and in Section 2; for the policy side of the debate, see for
instance FOMC (2008) and Blanchard (2009).
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Mumtaz and Zanetti, 2013). In this way we bypass the choice of an observed proxy for
uncertainty and use an indicator which is closer to its theoretical counterpart and more directly
linked to agents (in)ability to form predictions on the economys fundamentals. Second,
the model allows for the possibility that the transmission of the shocks may change when
nancial markets are dysfunctional. To this end, we include in the model an indicator of
nancial market distress (the Chicago Feds Financial Condition Index, which captures the
dynamics of a large set of nancial prices and quantities), and let the parameters of the
VAR shift when the indicator crosses an endogenously-determined critical threshold. This
combination of stochastic volatility and multiple regimes, which nds a natural justication
in this context, represents a methodological novelty that could be of wider interest to empirical
macroeconomists.
Our estimates show that the implications of an uncertainty shock di¤er signicantly across
nancial regimes. In normal times, uncertainty shocks are inationary and have relatively
little impact on output. When nancial markets are in distress, on the contrary, they are
deationary and they have an output multiplier which is roughly ve times larger. The share
of output variance explained by the shocks is modest in absolute terms, but twice as big in
times of nancial turmoil compared to calm periods (8% versus 4%). Once the nonlinearity
is taken into account, the shocks appear to be responsible for about 1% of the peak fall in
output observed in the Great Recession.3 These results provide new evidence on the pivotal
role played by nancial markets in propagating (or not) uncertainty shocks. They also point
to an important complication that must be taken into account when studying the role and
relative importance of nancial and uncertainty shocks in causing macroeconomic uctuations:
the two are not easily separable, because uncertainty becomes more relevant if/when the
economy has previously been subjected to a sequence of adverse nancial shocks. The Great
Recession provides a powerful illustration of this issue. Finally they suggest that, even though
uncertainty shocks constitute an independent source of economic volatility, it could be sensible
for policy makers to focus on monitoring and possibly ameliorating credit conditions rather
than worrying about uncertainty per se.
3In a related paper, Caggiano et al. (2014) study a model where the transmission mechanism is linked to
the real rather than the nancial cycle, nding on post-WWII US data that uncertainty shocks appear to be
more powerful during recessions. We discuss the relation between our work and theirsat length in sections 2
and 4.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and
discusses the logic behind, and some evidence of, the interaction between nancial markets and
uncertainty studied in this paper. Section 3 discusses model, data and estimation. Section
4 illustrates the results. Section 5 examines the robustness of the results to a number of
modelling assumptions. Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.
2 Literature
Economic uncertainty is known to be strongly countercyclical (see Bloom (2014) for a
recent survey of the evidence). This correlation is typically rationalized as the consequence
of the recessionary e¤ect of uncertainty shocks.4 The traditional view of this transmission
mechanism relies on some form of partial irreversibility in investment. Irreversibility generates
a wait-and-see e¤ect by which rms may optimally choose to postpone investment in the face of
a more volatile environment (Bernanke, 1983; Bloom, 2009; Bloom et al., 2012). A more recent
strand of research places nancial rather than real frictions at the centre of the transmission
mechanism (Arellano et al., 2012; Christiano et al., 2014; Gilchrist et al., 2014).5 If nancial
contracts are subject to agency or moral hazard problems, a rise in economic uncertainty
increases the premium on external nance, leading to an increase in the cost of capital faced
by rms (or borrowers more generally) and thus a fall in investment. The nancial view
of the transmission mechanism has two related implications. The rst one is that changes in
asset prices and credit aggregates are the crucial link in the transmission of uncertainty shocks
to the real economy. The second one is that the strength of the transmission mechanism is
tightly linked to the intensity of frictions in nancial markets. Using a quantitative model that
includes a rich set of real and nancial frictions, Gilchrist et al. (2014) show that uncertainty
has a modest impact on economic activity in a nancially frictionless economy. A similar
message is delivered by Pinter et al. (2013), who nd that the impact of uncertainty shocks
4We limit our discussion to set-ups where (i) uncertainty, risk and volatility are synonyms (i.e. uncertainty
is dened as, and assumed to coincide with, the actual volatility of some economic fundamental, either at
the aggregate or at the rm level); and (ii) causation runs from uncertainty to economic activity. Departures
from these hypotheses are examined for instance by Ilut and Schneider (2014) and Bachmann and Moscarini
(2012).
5The real/nancial divide sketched here is of course a stark simplication of the views that have been
put forward on the topic. Villaverde et al. (2011b) develop a small-open-economy model where uncertainty
appears in the form of heteroscedastic shocks to the real exogenous borrowing rate and a¤ects real aggregates
because of a hedging motive. Basu and Bundick (2012) study uncertainty in a model without either real
or nancial frictions, showing that nominal frictions and countercyclical markups are important to generate
plausible business cycle dynamics after an uncertainty shock.
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on output is an increasing function of the fraction of hand-to-mouth consumers in the economy
(a proxy of nancial market imperfections); and by Carriere-Swallow and Cespedes (2013),
whose comparative analysis shows that uncertainty shocks are relatively more powerful in
countries with underdeveloped nancial markets.
This paper examines the implications of the nancial viewof the transmission mechanism
along a di¤erent dimension, asking whether the impact of uncertainty shocks in the US has
changed over time in connection with the state of the nancial cycle. Our work is motivated
by the consideration that, while the underlying frictions are structural in nature, the liquidity
of nancial markets and the availability of external nance obviously depend on the state
of both borrowersand lendersbalance sheets, which in turn may change signicantly over
time under the inuence, for instance, of uctuations in real and nancial asset prices. When
balance sheets are sound and credit abundant, the US economy might resemble the frictionless
benchmarks studied as limiting cases by Gilchrist et al. (2014) and Pinter et al. (2012), where
the dynamics associated to uncertainty shocks are relatively subdued. Strained balance sheets,
low asset prices and thinnancial markets would on the contrary make the economy highly
vulnerable to a marginal increase in uncertainty.6 Models where agents face occasionally
binding borrowing or collateral constraints o¤er a natural way to think about this form of
state-dependence (Mendoza and Smith, 2006; Mendoza, 2010; Bianchi and Mendoza 2010;
Bianchi, 2011; He and Krishnamurty 2012, 2013; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014). In these
economies agents save to avoid being constrained in equilibrium, and strong non-linearities
arise when unexpected shocks push them close to the constraint. A number of authors have
documented the empirical relevance of this mechanism by showing that credit conditions can
signicantly alter the transmission of both real and nancial shocks (McCallum, 1991; Balke,
2000; Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2013). Our paper contributes to this literature by showing that
credit conditions also exert a critical inuence on the transmission of uncertainty shocks.
A number of studies have employed VAR frameworks to study the relation between un-
certainty and economic activity (a non-exclusive list would include Bloom 2009; Leduc and
Zheng, 2012; Bachmann et al. 2013; Carriero et al., 2013; Mumtaz and Surico, 2013; Bulligan
and Emiliozzi, 2014). These works do not consider uncertainty and nancial shocks jointly. A
rst attempt in this direction is Popescu and Smets (2010), who use a VAR with a recursive
6A cyclicality of this kind is unlikely to arise under the real viewof the transmission mechanism, because
in that case the underlying frictions are linked to technology and hence very likely to be xed over time.
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identication scheme where uncertainty is ordered before an index of nancial market condi-
tions, nding that nancial shocks are an important driver of real output whereas the impact
of uncertainty shocks is small and short-lived. Gilchrist et al. (2014) show that uncertainty
and credit spreads are strongly correlated and that the predictive power of uncertainty for
output is signicantly eroded if credit conditions are separately accounted for. The identi-
cation of credit and uncertainty shocks is the focus of Caldara et al. (2014). The authors
demonstrate that uncertainty shocks a¤ect output if and only if credit spreads are allowed to
respond contemporaneously to a change in uncertainty; the impact vanishes if this channel
is switched o¤ by the identication strategy, which provides further evidence in support of
the nancial viewof the transmission mechanism. We follow the same line of analysis, but
focus on modelling a potential interaction between nancial conditions and uncertainty which
is ruled out by construction in the linear set ups of Popescu and Smets (2010) and Caldara
et al. (2014).
The empirical evidence regarding time variation or state dependence in the transmission
of uncertainty shocks is relatively scant. Beetsma and Giuliodori (2012) estimate linear VARs
using rolling windows and show that the impact of uncertainty shocks on output in the US has
decreased over the last ve decades. Caggiano et al. (2014) use instead a Smooth-Transition
VAR where the parameters are allowed to depend on the state of the business cycle. The
model is estimated on quarterly post-war data for the US, and it suggests that uncertainty
shocks have a stronger impact on unemployment during recessions. Neither of these works
models the interdependence between uncertainty and nancial conditions. If the nancial
viewof the transmission channel is valid, this interdependence is obviously crucial. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper represents the rst attempt to describe it explicitly in a
nonlinear model. The comparison between our work and Caggiano et al. (2014) poses of course
an important question: assuming the transmission mechanism does change over time, is the
change driven by the state of the real or the nancial cycle? The close association typically
observed in the data between high uncertainty, credit contractions and slow growth makes this
a di¢ cult question to answer, but we provide evidence that the nancial hypothesisreceives
stronger support from the data.
Our econometric approach and our measure of uncertainty mark an important departure
from the literature. Instead of relying on observable proxies, such as realized equity price
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(Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2012) or the VIX index (Caggiano et al., 2014), we measure uncer-
tainty as the average volatility of the economys structural shocks, which in our framework
can be estimated directly from the data. This measure is closer to its theoretical counterpart
and it is more directly related to the overall predictability of the economic environment. As
Jurado et al. (2013) argue, economic predictability is the key factor for decision making, and
it has no obvious relation with many of the proxies commonly used in the empirical literature.7
The idea of using a single volatility process in a multivariate model has been introduced by
Carriero et al. (2012), while volatility-in-mean e¤ects are studied in the context of (other-
wise) linear VAR models by Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2012), Mumtaz and Surico (2013) and
Mumtaz and Zanetti (2013). The combination of stochastic volatility and regime switches is
a novelty of our approach.
3 A VAR with nancial regimes and volatility e¤ects
3.1 Structure of the model
Our starting point is a VAR model where the structural shocks have time-varying, stochastic
volatilities which inuence the rst-moment dynamics of the endogenous variables (Mumtaz
and Theodoridis, 2012; Mumtaz and Surico, 2013; Mumtaz and Zanetti, 2013). The model is
extended here in order to allow for these dynamics to be characterized by two distinct regimes,
corresponding to periods of calm and tense nancial markets. The model is dened as follows:
Zt =
 
c1 +
PX
j=1
1jZt j +
JX
j=0
1j lnt j + 

1=2
1t et
!
~St(1)
+
 
c2 +
PX
j=1
2jZt j +
JX
j=0
2j lnt j + 

1=2
2t et
!
(1  ~St)
Here Zt = fYt; Pt; Rt; Ftg is a set of four endogenous variables: industrial production growth,
consumer price ination, the three-month Treasury Bill rate and the Financial Condition
Index, an indicator of nancial distress published by the Chicago Fed (the data is described
in Section 3.2). Uncertainty is represented by t, which is dened below. We allow for the
7We discuss these points further in Section 3, and provide a comparison between our estimate of uncertainty
and that by Jurado et al. (2013) in Section 4.
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possibility of two distinct regimes, and consider the case where the regime is determined by
the level of some lag of the nancial indicator Ft d relative to an unobserved threshold Z:
(2) ~St = 1() Ft d  Z
Both the delay d and the threshold Z are unknown parameters. As in standard threshold
models, all parameters are allowed to change across regimes. In particular:

1t = A
 1
1 HtA
 10
1(3)

2t = A
 1
2 HtA
 10
2 ;
where A1 and A2 are lower triangular matrices. Finally, the volatility process is dened as:
Ht = tS(4)
S = diag(s1; s2; s3; s4)
lnt =  + F lnt 1 + t;
where t is an i.i.d. innovation with variance Q. Following Carriero et al. (2012), we thus
assume that a single, scalar volatility process t drives time variation of the entire variance-
covariance matrix of the structural shocks, and we take that process to represent economic
uncertainty. We set P = 13, a standard choice with monthly data, and J = 3, which means
that the state of the economy in month tmay be a¤ected by levels of uncertainty that prevailed
over the current quarter.
The novelty of this set up is its combination of a smoothly-changing volatility process
(equation 4) with shifts in regimes associated to periods of nancial distress (equations 12).
This combination allows us to remain close to the theoretical literature on uncertainty, which
typically postulates a process of the form of (4) for some of the shocks, while taking into
account a state-dependent transmission mechanism consistent with models that incorporate
occasionally binding nancial constraints. The model nests both a linear VAR with volatility
e¤ects and a TAR without volatility e¤ects, both of which provide useful benchmarks for our
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analysis. The two sets of parameters fci; ij; ij;
igi=1;2 can be thought of as capturing the
behavior of the economy in periods of tense and calm nancial markets, or binding and non-
binding nancial constraints, and no restriction is placed on how the primitive shocks et and t
play out in di¤erent regimes. As equation (4) shows, uncertainty is directly linked to agents
di¢ culty in forecasting the economys fundamentals. Intuitively, a volatility/uncertainty shock
t > 0 raises t, causing an upward shift in the covariance matrix of the innovations et and
hence a sudden deterioration of the accuracy with which agents can forecast Zt+k. By letting
t enter equation (1), we allow for the possibility that consumption and investment choices,
asset prices and monetary policy may adjust endogenously to the new, riskier state of the
economy.
We note that the specication of equation (4) implies that uncertainty is associated to
the average volatility of the structural shocks, in the sense that (i) all structural shocks are
implicitly given the same weight in estimating t, and (ii) common and idiosyncratic (i.e.
shock-specic) volatilities are treated symmetrically (both can inuence t). This formulation
is computationally convenient and is consistent with the approach suggested by Jurado et al.
(2013). As a matter of fact, our estimates of uncertainty turn out to be very similar to theirs,
as we show in Section 4. In principle one could take a di¤erent stance and think of economic
uncertainty specically as the common factor behind changes in the covariance matrix. In that
case, one would lter out any idiosyncratic variation in the volatilities and allow for shock-
specic loadings in order to estimate t. We consider this alternative in Section 5, and nd
that the di¤erence are immaterial from our point of view. Irrespective of how t is dened,
the volatility-in-mean specication employed in this paper has an important advantage: it
permits modeling the economys rst and second moments in a unied, internally-consistent
framework. In this model, agents form the expectation EtZt+k taking into account both the
persistence of t (if F 6= 0) and its e¤ect on Zt (if ij 6= 0 for some i; j), and this expectation
is integrated out in the impulse-response analysis. We regard this as a signicant conceptual
improvement relative to two-steps procedures of the type employed in Jurado et al. (2013).8
8The two steps in Jurado et al. (2013) are the following. First, uncertainty (Ut in their notation) is
calculated from the forecast errors for a set of macro-nancial indicators (Yt+k), using a forecasting model
and an information set that does not (and by construction cannot) include Ut itself. Second, the impact of
uncertainty shocks is studied in a VAR in [Yt Ut], where macro-nancial variables and uncertainty interact.
The problem with this is that while the rst step assumes that Ut does not a¤ect EtYt+k, the second investigates
precisely this linkage.
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3.2 Data
We use monthly data covering the period January 1973 to May 2014. Industrial produc-
tion index, consumer price index and the nominal three-month Treasury bill rate are taken
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) Database. To capture the state of nan-
cial markets in the US we use the Financial Condition Index (FCI), a real-time indicator of
nancial distress constructed and maintained by the Chicago Fed and described extensively in
Brave and Butters (2011, 2012). The index is extracted using dynamic factor analysis from a
set of 120 series that describe a broad range of money, debt and equity markets as well as the
leverage of the nancial industry. Its generality is particularly useful in our application, for
two related reasons. The rst one is that, since uncertainty shocks can a¤ect rmsthrough
a number of di¤erent markets, using a broad indicator is necessary in order to fully capture
the nancial side of the transmission mechanism. In particular, FCI includes spreads on bank
funding, bonds, repo, swap and securitization markets, all of which could in principle inu-
ence rmsaccess to external nance. The index also includes volume and quantity indicators
which could be important to capture forms of credit rationing that are not fully reected in
prices. The second related reason is that, given the strong unconditional correlation between
economic uncertainty and nancial conditions documented in the literature, controlling ac-
curately for the general state of nancial markets is important in order to isolate the role
played by uncertainty shocks a point that emerges clearly from both Caldara et al. (2014)
and Gilchrist et al. (2014). A narrow indicator might pick up only some of the variation in
aggregate nancing conditions; if the part that is left out is correlated with uncertainty, which
is likely, this could cause the model to overestimate the importance of the latter. By using
FCI we hope instead to quantify the impact of uncertainty netof all nancial information
available to the agents at any point in time.9
3.3 Estimation
This section describes the priors and the algorithm used to estimate the model. Following
Banbura et al. (2010) we introduce a natural conjugate prior for the VAR parameters Bi =
fci; ig via dummy observations. In our application, the prior means are chosen as the OLS
9A third advantage is that by using FCI we e¤ectively turn our VAR into a factor model that exploits a
large information set, thus reducing the risk of uncovering spurious non-linearities caused by the omission of
relevant variables. We investigate this issue further in Section 5.
10
estimates of the coe¢ cients of an AR(1) regression estimated for each endogenous variable
using a training sample. As is standard for US data, we set the overall prior tightness  = 0:1:
For the threshold we assume a normal prior, P (Z)~N( Z; V ) where Z = 1=T
PT
i=1 Zt and
V = 10. Given the scale of the nancial indicator this represents a fairly loose prior. We
assume a at prior on the delay d but limit its values between 1 and 12. The elements of S
have an inverse Gamma prior: P (si)~IG(S0;i; V0). The degrees of freedom V0 are set equal to
one. The prior scale parameters are set by estimating the following regression: it = S0;it+"t
where t is the rst principal component of the stochastic volatilities it obtained using a
univariate stochastic volatility model for the residuals of each equation of a VAR estimated
via OLS using the endogenous variables Zt. The prior for the o¤-diagonal elements A1 and
A2 is A0 s N
 
a^ols; V
 
a^ols

where a^ols are the o¤-diagonal elements of the inverse of the
Cholesky decomposition of v^ols, with each row scaled by the corresponding element on the
diagonal. These OLS estimates are obtained using the initial VAR model described above.
V
 
a^ols

is assumed to be diagonal with the elements set equal to 10 times the absolute value
of the corresponding element of a^ols. We set a normal prior for the unconditional mean of the
log-volatility,  = =(1   F ). This prior is N(0; Z0) where 0 = 0 and Z0 = 10:The prior
for Q is IG (Q0; VQ0) where Q0 is the average of the variances of the transition equations of
the initial univariate stochastic volatility estimates and VQ0 = 5: The prior for F is N (F0; L0)
where F0 = 0:8 and L0 = 1.
The MCMC algorithm for the estimation is based on drawing from the following conditional
posterior distributions:
1. G(Zn). Following Chen and Lee (1995) we use a random walk metropolis step to
draw Z: We draw a candidate value Znew from Z

new = Z

old + 	
1=2, ~N(0; 1). The
acceptance probability is given by f(ZtnZ

new;)
f(ZtnZold;)
where f (:) denotes the posterior density
and  represents all other parameters in the model. We choose the scaling factor 	 to
ensure that the acceptance rate remains between 20% and 40%. The posterior density
is given by L (Ztn)  P (Z) where the likelihood function is the product of the log
likelihoods in the two regimes. The calculation of the likelihood is described in the
appendix to Carriero et al. (2012).
2. G(dn): Chen and Lee (1995) show that the conditional posterior for d is a multinomial
distribution with probability L(Ztnd;)P12
d=1 L(Ztnd;)
where L (:) denotes the likelihood function.
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3. G(Bin):Given a draw of t, the left and the right hand side variables of the VAR: yt
and xt can be transformed to remove the heteroscedasticity in the following manner
~yt =
yt

1=2
t
; ~xt =
xt

1=2
t
Then the conditional posterior distribution for the VAR coe¢ cients in each regime is
standard and given by
N(Bi ; 
i 
 (X0i Xi ) 1)
where Bi = (X
0
i X

i )
 1 (X0i Y

i ); 
i = A
 1
i SA
 10
i and Y

i and X

i denote the transformed
data in regime i appended with the dummy observations.
4. G(Ain): Given a draw for the VAR parameters and the threshold the model in each
regime can be written asA0i (vit) = eit where vit = Zit ci+
PP
j=1 ijZit j+
PJ
j=0 ij lnt j
and V AR (et) = Ht. This is a system of linear equations with a known form of het-
eroscedasticity. The conditional distributions for a linear regression apply to each equa-
tion of this system after a simple GLS transformation to make the errors homoscedastic.
The jth equation of this system is given as vjt =  v jt + ejt where the subscript j
denotes the jth column while  j denotes columns 1 to j   1. Note that the variance of
ejt is time-varying and given by tsj. A GLS transformation involves dividing both sides
of the equation by
p
tsj to produce vjt =  v jt+ejt where * denotes the transformed
variables and var
 
ejt

= 1: The conditional posterior for  is normal with mean and
variance given by M and V  :
M =

V
 
a^ols
 1
+ v0 jtv

 jt
 1 
V
 
a^ols
 1
a^ols + v0 jtv

jt

V  =

V
 
a^ols
 1
+ v0 jtv

 jt
 1
5. G(Sn). Given a draw for the VAR parameters and the threshold the model in can
be written as (A01 (v1t)) ~S + (A
0
2 (v2t)) (1   ~S) = et: The jth equation of this system
is given by vjt = ( 1v jt) ~S + ( 1v jt) (1   ~S) + ejt where the variance of ejt is
time-varying and given by tsj: Given a draw for t this equation can be re-written as
vjt = ( 1v jt) ~S + ( 1v jt) (1   ~S) + ejt where vjt = vjt

1=2
t
and the variance of ejt is
sj. The conditional posterior is for this variance is inverse Gamma with scale parameter
12
e0jtejt + S0;j and degrees of freedom V0 + T:
6. Elements of t. Conditional on the VAR coe¢ cients, the regime variable ~S and the
parameters of the transition equation, the model has a multivariate non-linear state-
space representation. Carlin et al. (1992) show that the conditional distribution of the
state variables in a general state-space model can be written as the product of three
terms:
(5) ~htnZt; / f

~htn~ht 1

 f

~ht+1n~ht

 f

Ztn~ht;

where  denotes all other parameters and ~ht = lnt. In the context of stochastic
volatility models, Jacquier et al. (1994) show that this density is a product of log
normal densities for t and t+1 and a normal density for Zt:Carlin et al. (1992) de-
rive the general form of the mean and variance of the underlying normal density for
f

~htn~ht 1; ~ht+1;

/ f

~htn~ht 1

 f

~ht+1n~ht

and show that this is given as
(6) f

~htn~ht 1; ~ht+1;

 N (B2tb2t; B2t)
where B 12t = Q
 1 + F 0Q 1F and b2t = ~ht 1F 0Q 1 + ~ht+1Q 1F: Note that due to the
non-linearity of the observation equation of the model an analytical expression for the
complete conditional ~htnZt; is unavailable and a metropolis step is required. Following
Jacquier et al. (1994) we draw from 5 using a date-by-date independence metropolis step
using the density in 6 as the candidate generating density. This choice implies that the
acceptance probability is given by the ratio of the conditional likelihood f

Ztn~ht;

at
the old and the new draw. To implement the algorithm we begin with an initial estimate
of ~h = ln t We set the matrix ~hold equal to the initial volatility estimate. Then at each
date the following two steps are implemented:
(a) Draw a candidate for the volatility ~hnewt using the density 5 where b2t = ~h
new
t 1F
0Q 1+
~holdt+1Q
 1F and B 12t = Q
 1 + F 0Q 1F
(b) Update ~holdt = ~h
new
t with acceptance probability
f(Ztn~hnewt ;)
f(Ztn~holdt ;)
where f

Ztn~ht;

is
the likelihood of the VAR for observation t and dened as j
tj 0:5 0:5 exp
 
~et

 1
t ~e
0
t

where ~et = Zt [(c1+
PP
j=1 1jZt j+
PJ
j=0 1j
~ht j+

1=2
1t et) ~St + (c2+
PP
j=1 2jZt j+
13
PJ
j=0 2j
~ht j + 

1=2
2t et)(1  ~St)] and 
it = A 1i

exp(~ht)S

A 1
0
i .
Repeating these steps for the entire time series delivers a draw of the stochastic volatilities.10
7. G(; Fn):We re-write the transition equation in deviations from the mean
(7) ~ht    = F

~ht 1   

+ t
where the elements of the mean vector i are dened as
i
1 Fi : Conditional on a draw for
~ht and  the transition equation 7 is a simply a linear regression and the standard normal
and inverse Gamma conditional posteriors apply. Consider ~ht = F~h

t 1 +t; V AR (t) =
Qand ~ht = ~ht   ; ~ht 1 = ~ht 1   : The conditional posterior of F is N (; L) where
 =

L 10 +
1
Q
~h0t 1~h

t 1
 1
L 10 F0 +
1
Q
~h0t 1~h

t

L =

L 10 +
1
Q
~h0t 1~h

t 1
 1
The conditional posterior of Q is inverse Gamma with scale parameter 0tt +Q0 and degrees
of freedom T + VQ0.
Given a draw for F , equation 7 can be expressed as ~ht = C+ t where ~ht = ~ht   F~ht 1
and C = 1  F: The conditional posterior of  is N (; Z) where
 =

Z 10 +
1
Q
C 0C
 1
Z 10 0 +
1
Q
C 0 ~ht

Z =

Z 10 +
1
Q
C 0C
 1
Note that  can be recovered as  (1  ).
4 Results
Figure 1 shows the Financial Condition Index and the associated regimes. Gray bands
identify periods when the index is above the estimated critical threshold Z, implying that
10In order to take endpoints into account, the algorithm is modied slightly for the initial condition and the
last observation. Details of these changes can be found in Jacquier et al. (1994).
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the US economy is experiencing nancial distress. We refer to this as the crisis regime,
or regime 2. Figure 2 reproduces our estimate of ^t together with the measure of economic
uncertainty calculated by Jurado et al. (2013). The correlation between the two series is very
strong. This result is not too surprising given that the key assumptions behind our approach
to the measurement of uncertainty are essentially the same, as explained in Section 3. It
also suggests that the common volatility of the (relatively small) set of variables included in
our model provides a credible description of overall economic uncertainty, which Jurado et al.
(2013) estimate using a much larger dataset. Taken together, gures 1 and 2 clearly conrm
the stylized fact that high volatility, nancial tensions and low growth are often associated in
the recent history of the USA. The gures also provide a powerful illustration of the reason
why controlling for the price and availability of credit is so important in this context: any
model that studies the correlation between uncertainty and output without conditioning on
credit conditions is bound to exaggerate the impact of uncertainty on output. According to
both our estimates and Jurado et al. (2013), economic uncertainty was highest in the early
1980s and in 2007-2009. Both periods coincided with peaks in the nancial distress index
(as gure 1 shows, they are estimated to be occurrences of the crisis regime), and both were
associated to contractions in real output. A di¤erent pattern emerges however in the early
1990s and early 2000s recession. In those periods economic activity was stagnant but nancial
conditions were mild and uncertainty relatively low, particularly according to our measure.
This partial decoupling of real and nancial cycle is useful because it may provide information
on whether the nature of the transmission mechanism for uncertainty depends on the state of
the real or the nancial cycle we return to this point in Section 5.
Figure 3 plots the response of the system to both positive and negative one-standard-
deviation uncertainty shocks.11 The two rows show the responses corresponding respectively
to normal periods and crises. As the last column of the gure shows, the dynamics of our
measure of uncertainty t are identical in the two regimes (the stochastic volatility process is
not regime-dependent, see equation (4)). In both regimes, an increase in uncertainty leads to
a nancial tightening (column 4) and a contraction in output (column 1). The two responses
however are much more pronounced in the crisis regime. In particular, the fall in output is
11The impulse responses are obtained using monte carlo integration as described in Koop, Pesaran and Potter
(1995). In particular, the responses are calculated as IRFSt = E
 
Yt+kn	t; Y st 1; 
 E  Yt+kn	t; Y st 1, where
	t denotes all the parameters and hyperparameters of the model, k is the horizon under consideration, S = 0; 1
denotes the regime and  denotes the shock. All expectations are calculated by simulation.
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roughly six times larger: 0.17% versus 0.025%. The key prediction of the nancial viewof
the transmission mechanism is thus supported by the data: uncertainty shocks are relatively
inconsequential under good market conditions, when agents are nancially unconstrained, but
their impact on both credit markets and economic activity is greatly amplied during episodes
of nancial distress, when borrowing constraints bind more severely.
As the second column of gure 3 shows, the response of ination also changes dramatically
across regimes. In normal times prices increase after an increase in uncertainty, whereas in
a crisis they fall.12 The literature o¤ers mixed evidence on the relation between uncertainty
and ination. Uncertainty shocks are deationary for instance in the models of Christiano
et al. (2014) and Leduc and Zheng (2014), where they act as aggregate demand shocks,
but they are inationary in Villaverde et al. (2011a) and Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2012).
In the latter cases, high uncertainty on future demand and marginal costs makes it costly
for rms to underprice their products, and this introduces a (precautionary) upward bias in
their pricing decisions. One interpretation for our result is that this precautionary mechanism
prevails in good times but is dominated by the standard demand channel in bad times, when
binding borrowing constraints make aggregate demand relatively more sensitive to economic
uncertainty. Such a shift in the relative strength of the two factors could be reinforced by
the mechanism studied by Vavra (2014). Using an S-s pricing model, Vavra (2014) shows
that when rm-level volatility is high rms are more likely to be pushed outside their range
of pricing inaction by the shocks that hit them, so that price adjustments are more frequent
(and nominal rigidities overall less relevant) compared to periods of low volatility. Hence,
it is possible that the precautionary motive is more feeble in a crisis because rms know
that prices will change more frequently and are less worried about the risk of committing
to a predetermined price level for too long.13 We leave a more formal examination of these
speculations to future research. The response of the interest rate appears highly uncertain,
but the di¤erence between regimes is qualitatively intuitive in the light of the discussion above.
12As gure 3 shows, ination responds contemporaneously to the shock. An alternative specication where
this e¤ect is excluded by assuming that only lags of t enter equation (1) produces analogous results (see
Section 5).
13This conjecture relies on two premises. The rst one is that the crisis regime tends to be associated to
periods of high aggregate uncertainty as well as heightened nancial tensions. This is a fairly uncontroversial
implication of the strong link between uncertainty and nancial markets documented in the literature and
conrmed by gures 1-2. The second one is that aggregate and rm-level uncertainty are also correlated
(see e.g. Bloom, 2014). This means that most of our crises also coincide with periods of high rm-level
uncertainty, which makes the mechanism studied by Vavra (2014) potentially relevant in interpreting our
results.
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In a crisis both output and prices fall after an increase in uncertainty, so monetary policy can
work countercyclically and interest rates drop, in the sense that most of the distribution of Rt
lies below the zero line. In normal times instead the shock generates stagation, and monetary
policy appears to respond mainly to the increase in ination: most of the distribution of Rt
lies above the zero line. The condence bands, however, are very large in both regimes. This
suggests that historically there has been no systematic reaction by the Fed to variations in
uncertainty.14
The responses are symmetric for small and medium-size volatility shocks, but sign asym-
metry appears for larger shocks. Figure 4 displays the response of the system to a ve standard
deviation shock. The responses remain broadly symmetric in normal times (row 1), but are
clearly asymmetric in the crisis regime (row 2). In a crisis, a fall in volatility leads to a
smaller variation in output and prices than an equivalent increase in volatility. A similar form
of asymmetry between positive and negative uncertainty shocks is documented by Foerster
(2014). According to our model, this asymmetry is an implication of (i) the strong link that
connects volatility and nancial markets and (ii) the state-contingent nature of the frictions
that a¤ect the latter. An increase in volatility in bad times essentially keeps the economy
in a state where nancial markets are tense and the volatility multiplieris large. A fall in
volatility, on the other hand, generates a decline in nancial distress which may push the
economy back into a regime where borrowing constraints bind less and the multiplier is lower
because output is less sensitive to both uncertainty and credit conditions.
Figure 5 shows the contribution of volatility shocks to the forecast error variances (FEV)
of all endogenous variables. The fraction of output variance accounted for by volatility shocks
is twice as big in the crisis regime: approximately 8% versus 4%. These results are broadly
consistent with those of Caldara et al. (2014), who nd that uncertainty accounts for about
10% of the FEV for industrial production and employment.15 These gures are instead far
smaller than those reported by Caggiano et al. (2014), according to whom uncertainty explains
23% of the FEV of US unemployment in a linear VAR and as much as 62% of it in a smooth-
14This is of course another issue on which controlling for credit conditions can be important: if uncertainty
and credit shocks were accidentally mixed, the picture could look radically di¤erent.
15In our model nancial markets respond simultaneously to variations in uncertainty. Hence, our results
should be compared to those obtained by Caldara et al. (2014) under the identication scheme which does
not orthogonalise uncertainty shocks with respect to bond premia. In other words, the relevant benchmark for
us is what the authors label "uncertainty shocks" (rather than the "non-nancial uncertainty shocks", which
are obtained under an alternative, more restrictive identication scheme).
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transition VAR conditioning on recessions. This discrepancy might of course depend to some
extent on data and sampling issues. However, we submit that the key factor behind it relates
to the treatment of the nexus between uncertainty and nancial markets. As we noted above,
since credit conditions and uncertainty are strongly correlated, the role of uncertainty is likely
to be overestimated if the former are not adequately controlled for a point also made by
Caldara et al. (2014) and Gilchrist et al. (2014). The baseline model of Caggiano et al. (2014)
does not include any nancial variables. In one of the robustness tests, the authors nd indeed
that the impact of uncertainty on employment is halved if the S&P500 index is included in the
model, but none of the specications examined in the paper includes credit spreads, which are
instead a key ingredient both in the empirical analyses of Caldara et al. (2014) and Gilchrist
et al. (2014) and in our work. The Financial Condition Index employed in our baseline
specication includes spreads on a range of debt contracts (see Section 3.2); furthermore, our
results are broadly unchanged if FCI is replaced by a plain BAA corporate bond spread (see
Section 5). This leads to the conclusion that, roughly speaking, using credit spreads is both
necessary and su¢ cient in order to isolate the role of uncertainty. It is necessary because
leaving out the spreads biases the role of uncertainty upwards. It is also su¢ cient in the sense
that replacing the spreads with broader, more complex nancial condition proxies does not
alter the key estimates in a signicant way.16
We conclude this section with a counterfactual exercise aimed at providing a model-based
narrative on the historical role of uncertainty shocks in the US, particularly over the Great
Recession. The counterfactual world we consider is one where volatility shocks are switched o¤
(by setting t = 0 in equation (4)), so that t and thus the volatilities of all structural shocks
in the economy are constant at their sample means. The results are illustrated in gure 6.
The full model (Benchmark, red line) is compared to a VAR which retains the volatility-in-
mean component but ignores the nonlinearity associated to nancial market conditions (No
Threshold, black line). For each model and variable we plot the di¤erence between the actual
data and the series generated by the models under the counterfactual assumption. This
provides a gauge of the extent to which excluding the shock causes a discrepancy between
models and reality. The main variable of interest, industrial production, is displayed in the
16The di¤erence between the Caldara et al (2014) estimate (10%) and our own (4% to 8% depending on the
regime) is quantitatively less interesting, but again consistent with this interpretation: the broader the set of
nancial controls, the smaller the role assigned to uncertainty shocks.
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top left panel. The early-1980s and 2007-2009 periods are associated to negative values, which
means that excluding volatility shocks leads to an underestimation of the actual contraction
in output for both models. This e¤ect, however, is much smaller for the no-threshold model.
For the Great Recession period, switching o¤ the volatility shock causes a gap of only 0.2%
in the no-threshold model and of over 1% in the benchmark model. The bottom left panel
of gure 6 shows the counterfactual from a nancial market perspective. We know from the
impulse-response analysis that credit prices and quantities (as summarized by the FCI) are
themselves more sensitive to uncertainty in crisis conditions. In line with this nding, the
counterfactual shows that the threshold model falls short of replicating the FCI spikes of the
1980s and 2008-9 if volatility shocks are switched o¤. In the no-threshold model, excluding
the shocks has implications that are qualitatively similar (FCI is too low in recessions) but
quantitatively far less signicant. The message delivered by gure 6 is that accounting for the
amplication e¤ects caused by nancial distress is essential in order to e¤ectively gauge the
signicance of uncertainty in inuencing both nancial markets and real economic activity.
5 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we show that our key results are robust to various changes in the speci-
cation of the benchmark model. In particular, the results survive (i) the addition of extra
variables to the system; (ii) the use of a corporate bond spread rather than FCI to identify
nancial regimes; (iii) changes in the timing assumptions embedded in the model; (iv) the
introduction of a factor structure for the volatilities of the structural shocks; (v) the replace-
ment of the nancial threshold with a smooth-transition mechanism where the parameters
change gradually depending on the nancial condition indicator. We describe each of these
exercises in turn. In the nal subsection, we provide further supporting evidence for our key
results by examining (a) simpler models that exclude some of the non-linearities embedded
in our Threshold VAR, and (b) an analogous model where the change in the transmission
mechanism is driven by the real cycle (i.e. by industrial production) rather than the nancial
cycle.
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5.1 Expanding the information set
The benchmark model relies on an information set that is very rich on the nancial side,
due to the presence of the nancial conditions index, but relatively weak on the real side.
In the rst sensitivity analysis, we expand the set of non-nancial variables included in the
model in order to correct for any missing variable bias and account for the possibility of
non-fundamentalness of shocks (Forni and Gambetti, 2014). This is done by extending the
benchmark model and estimating a Factor Augmented TVAR with stochastic volatility. The
extended model is dened as follows
(8)
0@ Xit
Ft
1A =
0@ Bi 0
0 1
1A0@ ~Ft
Ft
1A+ vit; vit~N(0; Ri)
~Zt =
 
c1 +
PX
j=1
1j ~Zt j +
JX
j=0
1j lnt j + 

1=2
1t et
!
~St(9)
+
 
c2 +
PX
j=1
2j ~Zt j +
JX
j=0
2j lnt j + 

1=2
2t et
!
(1  ~St)
In the observation equation (8)Xit is a panel of 111macroeconomic variables taken from Stock
and Watson (2004) that incorporate information about real activity, ination and the yield
curve and include variables such as production and employment in various sectors, consumer
prices, producer and commodity prices and government bond yields. A full list is available
on request. ~Ft = f ~f1t; ~f2t; ::: ~fKtg are a set of K unobserved factors that summarize the
information inXit and Bi denote the associated factor loadings. The model treats the nancial
conditions index Ft as an observed factor.
The transition equation of the model is a TVAR in ~Zt = f ~f1t; ~f2t; ::: ~fKt; Ftg with stochastic
volatility in mean as in the benchmark model above. The dynamics of t are described in
equation 4. Therefore, in summary, this extended model incorporates additional information
through the factors ~Ft while retaining the threshold dynamics and stochastic volatility as in
the benchmark model. Estimation of the model requires three additional steps in the Gibbs
algorithm in order to draw from the conditional posterior distribution of ~Ft; Bi and R. These
are described in the appendix. We x K = 3 and the lag specication is the same as in the
benchmark case. This value for K ensures that the number of regime-specic parameters to
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be estimated in the transition equation remains feasible given the number of observations in
each regime.
The top panel of gure 7 shows the regime specic impulse responses of Yt and Pt from
Factor Augmented TVAR to a 1 standard deviation volatility shock.17 It is immediately
clear that the regime 2 response of industrial production is substantially larger. As in the
benchmark model, the regime 2 response of ination is strongly negative. Finally, the third
panel of the top row shows that the estimated volatility from this model is very similar to the
benchmark model.
5.2 Alternative threshold variable
As noted above, the Financial Conditions Index provides a wide measure of nancial
conditions. As shown in the second row of gure 7, the results hold if the threshold is dened
over a narrower indicator of credit conditions, namely the BAA corporate bond yield spread
(over the 10 year government bond yield). In particular, we estimate a version of the model
where the spread is included as an additional endogenous variable and is also used to determine
the regime switches. The second row of the gure shows that in the regime characterized by
a high level of the spread (regime 2), the response of industrial production to an uncertainty
shock is much larger than in times when credit is relatively cheaper (regime 1). The response
of ination shows the same pattern as in the benchmark case. The nal panel shows that the
estimated volatility is also similar to the benchmark case.
5.3 Timing of the volatility impact
The benchmark model incorporates the possibility that uncertainty shocks have a con-
temporaneous impact on all variables. We nd that the impulse responses are not sensitive to
this assumption. In particular, we estimate a version of the benchmark model that restricts
the contemporaneous impact of t on industrial production and ination to be zero (but still
allows the nancial variables to be a¤ected contemporaneously). The results from this version
of the model are shown in the fourth row of gure 7 and match the benchmark results closely.
17The variables in Xit are standardised. The resulting impulse responses are converted back to percentages.
However, because of the initial standardisation, the scale of t can be di¤erent from the original model. In
gure 7 we re-scale the impulse responses to match the average di¤erence in the scale of t estimated using
the FAVAR and the benchmark model.
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5.4 Common factor in volatility
The volatility specication in equation (4) does not explicitly identify a common factor.
As argued in Section 3, in our application it is sensible to focus on the average volatility of the
shocks rather than the common volatility in a strict sense. Nevertheless, when we explicitly
specify a factor structure, the impulse-response functions to uncertainty shocks do not change.
In particular, we estimate a version of the benchmark model where the specication of the
error covariance matrix changes as follows:
Ht = diag(hitsi)
where
(10) lnhit = bi lnt + ln eit
The factor loadings are denoted by bi: The common factor lnt follows the transition
equation dened in equation (4), while eit is assumed to be white noise. Equation (10)
decomposes the log volatility of each shock hit into a common and an idiosyncratic component.
This means that t is now estimated stripping out the idiosyncratic component and allowing
for shock-specic loadings bi. As in the benchmark model, lnt is allowed to a¤ect the
endogenous variables. While this model can be easily estimated using a slight modication
of the MCMC algorithm described above, we found (for our dataset) that identifying the
unobserved components in the shock volatility requires tight priors on the dynamics and scale
of lnt and ln eit. The last row of gure 7 shows the estimated response to a one standard
deviation shock to t. The pattern of the responses is very similar to the benchmark case,
with the crisis regime being associated to a much larger response of industrial production
and a change in the sign of the ination response. The last panel of the gure shows that
the common component is highly correlated with the volatility estimate obtained from the
benchmark model.
5.5 Smooth transition
The benchmark model assumes that a threshold determines the transitions across states.
The implied regime changes are thus abrupt a feature that seems to be consistent with the
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onset of the periods of nancial stress in our sample period. However, to account for the
possibility that the transitions across regimes are smooth we estimate a version of the model
that employes a logistic function to model changes in regimes. In particular, the regime process
is dened as
(11) ~St = 1  [1 + exp (  (Ft d   Z))] 1
where  > 0 determines the smoothness of the function. As  !1 the specication collapses
to the threshold model considered in the benchmark case.18 The estimated transition function
1  ~St is plotted in gure 8. The regimes are similar to those obtained in the benchmark case
and the transitions appear to be quite abrupt, which conrms that a threshold specication
is a good description of the data. The impulse-responses from this model are shown in the
third row of gure 7. To summarize the results, we dene normal times (i.e. regime 1) as
periods when ~St > 0:5, classify all remaining periods as bad times (i.e. regime 2), and show
the average responses corresponding to these two cases. The key result is clearly supported
by the model: the fall in industrial production is much larger in bad times (regime 2). For
ination, the responses are qualitatively similar to those of the benchmark model, although
the di¤erences between regimes are less pronounced.
5.6 Further evidence on nancial regimes
The model used in this paper is complex and highly nonlinear. As a reality check on
its plausibility, we compare it to a set of simpler alternatives using the Deviance Information
Criterion (DIC) of Spiegelhalter et al. (2002).19 We consider ve di¤erent specications of
the model. The benchmark is again represented by the model described in Section 3. As
an alternative, we rst rule out a direct impact of uncertainty on the endogenous variables,
setting ij = 0, while retaining the double-regime structure (No Uncertainty). This delivers
a model that accounts for the nonlinearity stemming from the existence of credit or collateral
constraints (and documented elsewhere in the literature, see Section 2), but does not assign
any role to uncertainty. Then, symmetrically, we consider a model that allows for a link be-
18The estimation of this model can be carried out with minimal changes to the Gibbs algorithm described
above. In particular, a Metropolis step is used to draw  from its conditional posterior. See Lopes and Salazar
(2006) for details.
19DIC is calculated using the mean likelihood of the model and a penalty correction that penalizes model
complexity, measured by the number of e¤ective parameters. Low values indicate good models.
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tween uncertainty and macro-nancial aggregates but ignores the possibility of changes in the
transmission mechanism, i.e. a volatility-in-mean VAR à la Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2012)
(No Threshold). In a third experiment we combine the two restrictions above (No Thresh-
old & No Uncertainty), obtaining a linear VAR without uncertainty. Finally we consider a
specication with the same structure as the benchmark, but where the regimes are driven by
industrial production rather than the nancial condition index (IP-based Threshold). In this
latter case, we try to exploit the close-but-not-perfect correlation between volatility, credit
conditions and growth in the data to compare our characterization of the transmission mecha-
nism to the "real" alternative studied by Caggiano et al. (2014), who focus on recessions rather
than periods of nancial tension. The results are reported in Table 1. Note rst that both
the No Uncertainty and the No Threshold restriction worsen DIC relative to the benchmark.
The e¤ect is compounded if they are imposed jointly (No Threshold & No Uncertainty). The
data is thus suggestive of both volatility e¤ects and multiple regimes. Secondly, the IP-based
Threshold model has the highest (i.e. worst) DIC of all. Its performance is signicantly worse
than the benchmarks, which implies that nancial conditions are a better candidate than
industrial production to identify changes in the shock transmission mechanism. The model
is also worse than the two specications without regimes (No Threshold, No Threshold & No
Uncertainty). This suggests that the increase in complexity associated to the regime-switching
mechanism does not payo¤ if output is used in the transition equation. The impulse-responses
generated by this model (which we do not report for brevity) do provide evidence of an asym-
metry that is consistent with Caggiano et al. (2014), whereby uncertainty shocks have a larger
impact on output in low-growth environments. Nevertheless, the balance of evidence is clearly
more consistent with the hypothesis that structural changes are driven by nancial conditions
rather than the real business cycle.
6 Conclusions
Financial frictions are known to play an important role in the transmission of uncertainty
shocks. This paper documents a new aspect of the interaction between the two by showing that
an exogenous increase in economic uncertainty may have radically di¤erent macroeconomic
implications depending on the conditions that prevail in nancial markets when the shock
materializes. Using monthly US data covering the period from January 1973 to May 2014, we
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estimate a nonlinear VAR where uncertainty is proxied by the average (unobserved) volatility
of the economys structural shocks, and a regime change occurs whenever nancial markets
experience a high level of distress. The regime associated to high nancial distress identies
periods in US history where nancial constraints were relatively more severe because balance
sheets in the private sector were strained, such as the early 1980s and the 2007-2009 crisis.
We nd that exogenous increases in uncertainty have a recessionary e¤ect in both normal
and distressed nancial market conditions, but their impact on output is ve times larger
when nancial markets do not function smoothly. Accounting for this nonlinearity, the shocks
explain 1% of the peak fall in industrial production observed in the 20072009 recession.
These results provide further support for the nancial viewof the transmission mechanism of
uncertainty shocks (Christiano et al., 2014; Caldara et al., 2014; Gilchrist et al., 2014). They
also point to a complication that must be taken into account when examining the relative
importance of credit and uncertainty shocks in causing macroeconomic uctuations: the two
are not easily separable, because uncertainty becomes more relevant if and when the economy
has previously been subjected to a sequence of adverse nancial shocks. The Great Recession
provides a powerful illustration of this issue. Our results suggest that, even though uncertainty
shocks constitute an independent source of economic volatility, policy makers could focus on
monitoring nancial markets and preventing nancial disruptions rather than worrying about
uncertainty per se.
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Model DIC
Benchmark -5700.4
i. No Uncertainty -5680.2
ii. No Threshold -5687.5
iii. No Threshold & No Uncertainty -5669.7
iv. IP-based Threshold -5638.3
Table 1: Deviance Information Criterion. The table reports the Deviance Information
Criterion of Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) for ve di¤erent specications of the model. Benchmark
is the full model described in Section 3. Model (i) rules out a direct impact of uncertainty
(while retaining the two-regime structure). Model (ii) assumes a single regime (while allow-
ing for the impact of uncertainty on the rest of the system). Model (iii) combines the two
restrictions. Model (iv) has the same structure as the benchmark, but assumes that switches
between regimes are driven by industrial production rather than the nancial condition index.
31
Figure 1: Financial regimes. The Financial Indicator is an index of nancial market distress
based on a dynamic factor model. Grey bands identify the subperiods when the US economy
is estimated to be in a crisis, dened as a state where the index exceeds the critical threshold
dened in equation (2).
Figure 2: Economic uncertainty. The red line is the median estimate of the average volatility
of the structural shocks hitting the US economy (t , see Section 3). The black line is the
uncertainty estimate proposed by Jurado et al. (2013).
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Figure 8: STAR transition function. The Financial Indicator is an index of nancial market
distress based on a dynamic factor model. The grey area shows the transition function from a
Smooth Transition VAR model where the transition across regimes is driven by the nancial
indicator. See section 5 for details.
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